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THE REIGN OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES VA VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE, FROM THE SUBVERSION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE TO THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
SECTION II
VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE WITH RESPECT
TO THE COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL FORCE REQUISITE IN FOREIGN OPERATIONS.
Such are the events and institutions which, by their
powerful operation, contributed gradually to introduce regular government and
polished manners into the various nations of Europe. When we survey the state
of society, or the character of individuals, at the opening of the fifteenth
century, and then turn back to view the condition of both at the time when the
barbarous tribes, which overturned the Roman power, completed their settlement
in their new conquests, the progress which mankind had made towards order and
refinement will appear immense.
Government, however, was still far from having
attained that state, in which extensive monarchies act with the united vigor of
the whole community, or carry on great undertakings with perseverance and
success. Small tribes or communities, even in their rudest state, may operate
in concert, and exert their utmost force. They are excited to act not by the
distant objects or the refined speculations which interest or affect men in
polished societies, but by their present feelings. The insults of an enemy
kindle resentment; the success of a rival tribe awakens emulation; these passions
communicate from breast to breast, and all the members of the community, with
united ardor, rush into the field in order to gratify their revenge, or to
acquire distinction. But in widely extended states, such as the great kingdoms
of Europe at the beginning of the fifteenth century, where there is little
intercourse between the distant members of the community, and where every great
enterprise requires previous concert and long preparation, nothing can rouse
and call forth their united strength, but the absolute command of a despot, or
the powerful influence of regular policy. Of the former, the vast empires in
the East are an example; the irresistible mandate of the sovereign reaches the
most remote provinces of his dominions, and compels whatever number of his
subjects he is pleased to summon, to follow his standard. The kingdoms of
Europe, in the present age, are an instance of the latter; the prince, by the
less violent, but no less effectual operation of laws and a well-regulated
government, is enabled to avail himself of the whole force of his state, and to
employ it in enterprises which require strenuous and persevering efforts.
But, at the opening of the fifteenth century, the
political constitution in all the kingdoms of Europe was very different from
either of these states of government. The several monarchs, though they had
somewhat enlarged the boundaries of prerogative by successful encroachments on
the immunities and privileges of the nobility, were possessed of an authority
extremely limited. The laws and interior police of kingdoms, though much
improved by the various events and regulations which I have enumerated, were
still feeble and imperfect. In every country, a numerous body of nobles, who
continued to be formidable notwithstanding the various expedients employed to
depress them, watched all the motions of their sovereign with a jealous
attention, which set bounds to his ambition, and either prevented his forming
schemes of extensive enterprise, or obstructed the execution of them.
The ordinary revenues of every prince were so
extremely small as to be inadequate to any great undertaking. He depended for
extraordinary supplies on the good-will of his subjects, who granted them often
with a reluctant, and always with a sparing hand.
As the revenues of princes were inconsiderable, the
armies which they could bring into the field were unfit for long and effectual
service. Instead of being able to employ troops trained to skill in arms, and
to military subordination, by regular discipline, monarchs were obliged to
depend on such forces as their vassals conducted to their standard in consequence
of their military tenures. These, as they were bound to remain under arms only
for a short time, could not march far from their usual place of residence, and
being more attached to the lord of whom they held, than to the sovereign whom
they served, were often as much disposed to counteract as to forward his
schemes. Nor were they, even if they had been more subject to the command of
the monarch, proper instruments to carry into execution any great and arduous
enterprise. The strength of an army, formed either for conquest or defence,
lies in infantry. To the stability and discipline of their legions, consisting
chiefly of infantry, the Romans, during the times of the republic, were
indebted for their victories; and when their descendants, forgetting the
institutions which had led them to universal dominion, so far altered their
military system as to place their principal confidence in a numerous cavalry,
the undisciplined impetuosity of the barbarous nations, who fought mostly on
foot, was sufficient, as I have already observed, to overcome them. These
nations, soon after they settled in their new conquests, uninstructed by the
fatal error of the Romans, relinquished the customs of their ancestors, and
converted the chief force of their armies into cavalry. Among the Romans this
change was occasioned by the effeminacy of their troops, who could not endure
the fatigues of service, which their more virtuous and hardy ancestors had
sustained with ease. Among the people who established the new monarchies into
which Europe was divided, this innovation in military discipline seems to have
flowed from the pride of the nobles, who, scorning to mingle with persons of
inferior rank, aimed at being distinguished from them in the field, as well as
during peace. The institution of chivalry, and the frequency of tournaments, in
which knights, in complete armour, entered the lists on horseback with
extraordinary splendor, displaying amazing address, force, and valor, brought
cavalry into still greater esteem. The fondness for that service increased to
such a degree, that during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the armies
of Europe were composed almost entirely of cavalry. No gentleman would appear
in the field but on horseback. To serve in any other manner, he would have
deemed derogatory to his rank. The cavalry, by way of distinction, was called
The Battle, and on it alone depended the fate of every action. The infantry,
collected from the dregs and refuse of the people, ill armed and worse
disciplined, was almost of no account.
As these circumstances rendered the operations of
particular kingdoms less considerable and less vigorous, so they long kept the
princes of Europe from giving such attention to the schemes and transactions of
their neighbors, as might lead them to form any regular system of public
security. They were, of consequence, prevented from uniting in confederacy, or
from acting with concert, in order to establish such a distribution and balance
of power, as should hinder any state from rising to a superiority, which might
endanger the general liberty and independence. During several centuries, the
nations of Europe appear to have considered themselves as separate societies,
scarcely connected together by any common interest, and little concerned in
each other’s affairs or operations. An extensive commerce did not afford them
an opportunity of observing and penetrating into the schemes of every different
state. They had not ambassadors residing constantly in every court to watch and
give early intelligence of all its motions. The expectation of remote
advantages, or the prospect of distant and contingent evils, were not
sufficient to excite nations to take arms. Such only as were within the sphere
of immediate danger, and unavoidably exposed to injury or insult, thought
themselves interested in any contest, or bound to take precautions for their
own safety.
Whoever records the transactions of any of the more
considerable European states, during the two last centuries, must write the
history of Europe. Its various kingdoms throughout that period, have been
formed into one great system, so closely united, that each holding a
determinate station, the operations of one are so felt by all, as to influence
their counsels and regulate their measures. But previous to the fifteenth
century, unless when vicinity of territory rendered the occasions of discord
frequent and unavoidable, or when national emulation fomented or embittered the
spirit of hostility, the affairs of different countries are seldom interwoven
with each other. In each kingdom of Europe great events and revolutions
happened, which the other powers beheld with almost the same indifference as if
they had been uninterested spectators, to whom the effect of these transactions
could never extend. During the violent struggles between France and England,
and notwithstanding the alarming progress which was made towards rendering one
prince the master of both these kingdoms, hardly one measure, which can be
considered as the result of a sagacious and prudent policy, was formed in order
to guard against an event so fatal to Europe. The Dukes of Burgundy and
Bretagne, whom their situation would not permit to remain neutral, engaged, it
is true, in the contest; but in taking their part, they seem rather to have
followed the impulse of their passions, than to have been guided by any just
discernment of the danger which threatened themselves and the tranquility of
Europe. The other princes, seemingly unaffected by the alternate successes of
the contending parties, left them to decide the quarrel by themselves, or
interposed only by feeble and ineffectual negotiations.
Notwithstanding the perpetual hostilities in which the
various kingdoms of Spain were engaged during several centuries, and the
successive occurrences which visibly tended to unite that part of the continent
into one great monarchy, the princes of Europe hardly took any step from which
we may conclude that they gave a proper attention to that important event. They
permitted a power to rise imperceptibly, and to acquire strength there, which
soon became formidable to all its neighbors.
Amidst the violent convulsions with which the spirit
of domination in the see of Rome, and the turbulent ambition of the German
nobles, agitated the empire, neither the authority of the popes, seconded by
all their artifices and intrigues, nor the solicitations of the emperors, could
induce any of the powerful monarchs of Europe to engage in their quarrel, or to
avail themselves of many favorable opportunities of interposing with effect and
advantage.
This amazing inactivity, during transactions so
interesting, is not to be imputed to any incapacity of discerning their political
consequences. The power of judging with sagacity, and of acting with vigor, is
the portion of men in every age. The monarchs who reigned in the different
kingdoms of Europe during several centuries, were not blind to their particular
interest, negligent of the public safety, or strangers to the method of
securing both. If they did not adopt that salutary system, which teaches modern
politicians to take the alarm at the prospect of distant dangers, which prompts
them to check the first encroachments of any formidable power, and which
renders each state the guardian, in some degree, of the rights and independence
of all its neighbors, this was owing entirely to such imperfections and
disorders in the civil government of each country, as made it impossible for
sovereigns to act suitably to those ideas which the posture of affairs, and
their own observation, must have suggested.
But during the course of the fifteenth century,
various events happened, which, by giving princes more entire command of the force
in their respective dominions, rendered their operations more vigorous and
extensive. In consequence of this, the affairs of different kingdoms becoming
more frequently as well as more intimately connected, they were gradually
accustomed to act in concert and confederacy, and were insensibly prepared for
forming a system of policy, in order to establish or to preserve such a balance
of power as was most consistent with the general security. It was during the
reign of Charles the Fifth, that the ideas, on which this system is founded,
first came to be fully understood. It was then, that the maxims by which it has
been uniformly maintained since that era, were universally adopted. On this
account, a view of the causes and events which contributed to establish a plan
of policy, more salutary and extensive than any that has taken place in the
conduct of human affairs, is not only a necessary, introduction to the
following work, but is a capital object in the history of Europe.
Revolution in the French Army
The first event that occasioned any considerable
alteration in the arrangement of affairs in Europe, was the annexation of the
extensive territories, which England possessed on the continent, to the crown
of France. While the English were masters of several of the most fertile and
opulent provinces in France, and a great part of its most martial inhabitants
was bound to follow their standard, an English monarch considered himself
rather as the rival, than as the vassal of the sovereign of whom he held. The
kings of France, circumscribed and thwarted in their schemes and operations by
an adversary no less jealous than formidable, durst not enter upon any
enterprise of importance or of difficulty. The English were always at hand,
ready to oppose them. They disputed even their right to their crown, and being
able to penetrate, with ease, into the heart of the kingdom, could arm against
them those very hands which ought to have been employed in their defence. Timid
counsels and feeble efforts were natural to monarchs in such a situation.
France, dismembered and overawed, could not attain its proper station in the
system of Europe. But the death of Henry V of England, happily for France, and
not unfortunately for his own country, delivered the French from the calamity
of having a foreign master seated on their throne. The weakness of a long
minority, the dissensions in the English court, together with the unsteady and
languid conduct which these occasioned, afforded the French a favorable
opportunity of recovering the territories which they had lost. The native valor
of the French nobility heightened to an enthusiastic confidence by a supposed
interposition of Heaven in their behalf; conducted in the field by skillful
leaders; and directed in the cabinet by a prudent monarch; was exerted with
such vigor and success, during this favorable juncture, as not only wrested
from the English their new conquests, but stripped them of their ancient
possessions in France, and reduced them within the narrow precincts of Calais,
and its petty territory.
As soon as so many considerable provinces were
reunited to their dominions, the kings of France, conscious of this acquisition
of strength, began to form bolder schemes of interior policy, as well as of
foreign operations. They immediately became formidable to their neighbors, who
began to fix their attention on their measures and motions, the importance of
which they fully perceived. From this era, France, possessed of the advantages
which it derives from the situation and contiguity of its territories, as well
as from the number and valor of its people, rose to new influence in Europe,
and was the first power in a condition to give alarm to the jealousy or fears
of the states around it.
Nor was France indebted for this increase of
importance merely to the reunion of the provinces which had been torn from it.
A circumstance attended the recovery of these, which, though less considerable,
and less observed, contributed not a little to give additional vigor and
decision to all the efforts of that monarchy. During the obstinate struggles
between France and England, all the defects of the military system under the
feudal government were sensibly felt. A war of long continuance languished,
when carried on by troops bound and accustomed to keep the field for a short
time. Armies, composed chiefly of heavy-armed cavalry, were unfit either for
the defence or the attack of the many towns and castles, which it became
necessary to guard or to reduce. In order to obtain such permanent and effective
force, as became requisite during these lengthened contests, the kings of
France took into their pay considerable bands of mercenary soldiers, levied
sometimes among their own subjects, and sometimes in foreign countries. But as
the feudal policy provided no sufficient fund for such extraordinary service,
these adventurers were dismissed at the close of every campaign, or upon any
prospect of accommodation; and having been little accustomed to the restraints
of discipline, they frequently turned their arms against the country which they
had been hired to defend, and desolated it with cruelty not inferior to that of
its foreign enemies.
A body of troops kept constantly on foot, and
regularly trained to military subordination, would have supplied what was
wanting in the feudal constitution, and have furnished princes with the means
of executing enterprises to which they were then unequal. Such an
establishment, however, was so repugnant to the genius of feudal policy, and so
incompatible with the privileges and pretensions of the nobility, that during
several centuries no monarch was either so bold, or so powerful, as to venture
on any step towards introducing it. At last, Charles VII availing himself of
the reputation which he had acquired by his successes against the English, and
taking advantage of the impressions of terror which such a formidable enemy had
left upon the minds of his subjects, executed that which his predecessors durst
not attempt. Under pretence of having always ready a force sufficient to defend
the kingdom against any sudden invasion of the English, he, at the time when he
disbanded his other troops [AD 1445], retained under arms a body of nine
thousand cavalry, and of sixteen thousand infantry. He appropriated funds for
the regular payment of these; he stationed them in different places of the
kingdom, according to his pleasure; and appointed the officers who commanded
and disciplined them. The prime nobility courted this service, in which they
were taught to depend on their sovereign, to execute his orders, and to look up
to him as the judge and rewarder of their merit. The feudal militia, composed
of the vassals whom the nobles could call out to follow their standard, as it
was in no degree comparable to a body of soldiers regularly trained to war,
sunk gradually in reputation. The strength of an army was no longer estimated
solely by the number of cavalry which served in it. From the time that
gunpowder was invented, and the use of cannon in the field became general,
horsemen cased in complete armour lost all the advantages which gave them the
pre-eminence over other soldiers. The helmet, the shield, and the breastplate,
which resisted the arrow or the spear, no longer afforded them security against
these new instruments of destruction. The service of infantry rose again into
esteem, and victories were gained, and conquests made, chiefly by their
efforts. The nobles and their military tenants, though sometimes summoned to
the field, according to ancient form, were considered as an encumbrance upon
the troops with which they acted; and were viewed with contempt by soldiers
vigorous and steady operations of regular service.
Thus the regulations of Charles VII, by establishing
the first standing army known in Europe, occasioned an important revolution in
its affairs and policy. By taking from the nobles the sole direction of the
national military force, which had raised them to such high authority and
importance, a deep wound was given to the feudal aristocracy, in that part
where its power seemed to be most complete.
France, by forming this body of regular troops at a
time when there was hardly a squadron or company kept in constant pay in any
other part of Europe, acquired such advantages over its neighbors, either in
attack or defence, that self-preservation made it necessary for them to imitate
its example. Mercenary troops were introduced into all the considerable
kingdoms on the continent. They gradually became the only military force that
was employed or trusted. It has long been the chief object of policy to
increase and to support them. It has long been the great aim of princes and
ministers to discredit and to annihilate all other means of national activity
or defence.
As the kings of France got the start of other powers
in establishing a military force in their dominions, which enabled them to
carry on foreign operations with more vigor, and to greater extent, so they
were the first who effectually broke the feudal aristocracy, and humbled the
great vassals of the crown, who by their exorbitant power had long
circumscribed the royal prerogative within very narrow limits, and had rendered
all the efforts of the monarchs of Europe inconsiderable. Many things concurred
to undermine, gradually, the power of the feudal aristocracy in France.
Decline of the Feudal Aristocracy
The wealth and property of the nobility were greatly
impaired during the long wars which the kingdom was obliged to maintain with
the English. The extraordinary zeal with which they exerted themselves in
defence of their country against its ancient enemies, exhausted entirely the
fortunes of some great families. As almost every province in the kingdom was,
in its turn, the seat of war, the lands of others were exposed to the
depredations of the enemy, were ravaged by the mercenary troops which their
sovereigns hired occasionally, but could not pay, or were desolated with rage
still more destructive, by the peasants, in different insurrections. At the
same time, the necessities of government having forced their kings upon the
desperate expedient of making great and sudden alterations in the current coin
of the kingdom, the fines, quit-rents, and other payments fixed by ancient
custom, sunk much in value, and the revenues of a fief were reduced far below
the sum which it had once yielded. During their contests with the English, in
which a generous nobility courted every station where danger appeared, or honor
could be gained, many families of note became extinct, and their fiefs were
reunited to the crown. Other fiefs, in a long course of years, fell to female
heirs, and were divided among them; were diminished by profuse donations to the
church, or were broken and split by the succession of remote collateral heirs.
Encouraged by these manifest symptoms of decline in that
body which he wished to depress, Charles VII during the first interval of peace
with England, made several efforts towards establishing the regal prerogative
on the ruins of the aristocracy. But his obligations to the nobles were so
many, as well as recent, and their services in recovering the kingdom so
splendid, as rendered it necessary for him to proceed with moderation and
caution. Such, however, was the authority which the crown had acquired by the
progress of its arms against the English, and so much was the power of the
nobility diminished, that, without any opposition, he soon made innovations of
great consequence in the constitution. He not only established that formidable
body of regular troops, which has been mentioned, but he was the first monarch
of France, who, by his royal edict [AD 1440], without the concurrence of the
States-general of the kingdom, levied an extraordinary subsidy on his people.
He prevailed likewise with his subjects, to render several taxes perpetual,
which had formerly been imposed occasionally and exacted during a short time.
By means of all these innovations, he acquired such an increase of power, and
extended his prerogative so far beyond its ancient limits, that, from being the
most dependent prince who had ever sat upon the throne of France, he came to
possess, during the latter years of his reign, a degree of authority which none
of his predecessors had enjoyed for several ages.
That plan of humbling the nobility which Charles began
to execute, his son Louis XI carried on with a bolder spirit, and with greater
success. Louis was formed by nature to be a tyrant; and at whatever period he
had been called to ascend the throne, his reign must have abounded with schemes
to oppress his people, and to render his own power absolute. Subtle, unfeeling,
cruel; a stranger to every principle of integrity, and regardless of decency,
he scorned all the restraints which a sense of honor, or the desire of fame,
impose even upon ambitious men. Sagacious, at the same time, to discern what he
deemed his true interest, and influenced by that alone, he was capable of
pursuing it with a persevering industry, and of adhering to it with a
systematic spirit, from which no object could divert, and no danger could deter
him.
The maxims of his administration were as profound as
they were fatal to the privileges of the nobility. He filled all the
departments of government with new men, and often with persons whom he called
from the lowest as well as most despised functions of life, and raised at pleasure
to stations of great power or trust. These were his only confidents, whom he
consulted in forming his plans, and to whom he committed the execution of them:
while the nobles, accustomed to be the companions, the favorites, and the
ministers of their sovereigns, were treated with such studied and mortifying
neglect, that if they would not submit to follow a court in which they appeared
without any shadow of their ancient power, they were obliged to retire to their
castles, where they remained unemployed and forgotten. Not satisfied with
having rendered the nobles of less consideration, by taking out of their hands
the sole direction of affairs, Louis added insult to neglect; and by violating
their most valuable privileges, endeavored to degrade the order, and to reduce
the members of it to the same level with other subjects. Persons of the highest
rank among them, if so bold as to oppose his schemes, or so unfortunate as to
awaken the jealousy of his capricious temper, were persecuted with rigor, from
which all who belonged to the order of nobility had hitherto been exempted;
they were tried by judges who had no right to take cognizance of their actions;
and were subject to torture, or condemned to an ignominious death, without
regard to their birth or condition. The people, accustomed to see the blood of
the most illustrious personages shed by the hands of the common executioner, to
behold them shut up in dungeons, and carried about in cages of iron, began to
view the nobility with less reverence than formerly, and looked up with terror
to the royal authority, which seemed to have humbled or annihilated every other
power in the kingdom.
At the same time, Louis, being afraid that oppression
might rouse the nobles, whom the rigor of his government had intimidated, or
that self-preservation might at last teach them to unite, dexterously scattered
among them the seeds of discord; and industriously fomented those ancient
animosities between the great families, which the spirit of jealousy and
emulation, natural to the feudal government, had originally kindled and still
kept alive. To accomplish this, all the arts of intrigue, all the mysteries and
refinements of his fraudulent policy were employed, and with such success, that
at a juncture which required the most strenuous efforts, as well as the most
perfect union, the nobles never acted, except during one short sally of
resentment at the beginning of his reign, either with vigor or in concert.
As he stripped the nobility of their privileges, he
added to the power and prerogative of the crown. In order to have at command
such a body of soldiers as might be sufficient to crush any force that his
disaffected subjects could draw together, he not only kept on foot the regular
troops which his father had raised, but, besides augmenting their number
considerably, he took into his pay six thousand Swiss, at that time the best
disciplined and most formidable infantry in Europe. From the jealousy natural
to tyrants, he confided in these foreign mercenaries, as the most devoted
instruments of oppression, and the most faithful guardians of the power which
he had usurped. That they might be ready to act on the shortest warning, he,
during the latter years of his reign, kept a considerable body of them encamped
in one place.
Great funds were requisite, not only to defray the
expense of this additional establishment, but to supply the sums employed in
the various enterprises which the restless activity of his genius prompted him
to undertake. But the prerogative that his father had assumed, of levying taxes
without the concurrence of the States-general, which he was careful not only to
retain but to extend, enabled him to provide in some measure for the increasing
charges of government.
What his prerogative, enlarged as it was, could not
furnish, his address procured. He was the first monarch in Europe who
discovered the method of managing those great assemblies, in which the feudal
policy had vested the power of granting subsidies and of imposing taxes. He
first taught other princes the fatal art of beginning their attack on public
liberty, by corrupting the source from which it should flow. By exerting all
his power and address in influencing the election of representatives, by
bribing or overawing the members, and by various changes which he artfully made
in the form of their deliberations, Louis acquired such entire direction of
these assemblies, that, from being the vigilant guardians of the privilege and
property of the people, he rendered them tamely subservient towards promoting
the most odious measures of his reign. As no power remained to set bounds to
his exactions, he not only continued all the taxes imposed by his father, but
made great additions to them, which amounted to a sum that appeared astonishing
to his contemporaries.
Nor was it the power alone or wealth of the crown that
Louis increased; he extended its territories by acquisitions of various kinds.
He got possession of Roussillon by purchase; Provence was conveyed to him by
the will of Charles d'Anjou; and upon the death of Charles the Bold, he seized
with a strong hand Burgundy and Artois, which had belonged to that prince.
Thus, during the course of a single reign, France was formed into one compact
kingdom, and the steady unrelenting policy of Louis Xl not only subdued the
haughty spirit of the feudal nobles, but established a species of government, scarcely
less absolute, or less terrible than eastern despotism.
But fatal as his administration was to the liberties
of his subjects, the authority which he had acquired, the resources of which he
became master, and his freedom from restraint in concerting his plans as well
as in executing them, rendered his reign active and enterprising. Louis
negotiated in all the courts of Europe; he observed the motions of all his
neighbors; he engaged, either as principal, or as an auxiliary, in every great
transaction; his resolutions were prompt, his operations vigorous; and upon
every emergence he could call forth into action the whole force of his kingdom.
From the era of his reign, the kings of France, no longer fettered and
circumscribed at home by a jealous nobility, have exerted themselves more
abroad, have formed more extensive schemes of foreign conquests, and have
carried on war with a spirit and vigour long unknown in Europe.
The example which Louis set was too inviting not to be
imitated by other princes. Henry VII, as soon as he was seated on the throne of
England, formed the plan of enlarging his own prerogative, by breaking the
power of the nobility. The circumstances under which he undertook to execute
it, were less favorable than those which induced Charles VII to make the same
attempt; and the spirit with which he conducted it, was very different from
that of Louis XI. Charles, by the success of his arms against the English, by
the merit of having expelled them out of so many provinces, had established
himself so firmly in the confidence of his people, as encouraged him to make
bold encroachments on the ancient constitution. The daring genius of Louis broke
through every barrier, and endeavored to surmount or to remove every obstacle
that stood in his way. But Henry held the scepter by a disputed title; a
popular faction was ready every moment to take arms against him; and after long
civil wars, during which the nobility had often displayed their power in
creating and deposing kings, he felt that the legal authority had been so much
relaxed, and that he entered into possession of a prerogative so much abridged,
as rendered it necessary to carry on his measures deliberately, and without any
violent exertion. He endeavored to undermine that formidable structure, which
he durst not attack by open force. His schemes, though cautious and slow
in their operation, were well concerted, and productive in the end of great
effects. By his laws, permitting the barons to break the entails of their
estates, and expose them to sale; by his regulations to prevent the nobility
from keeping in their service those numerous bands of retainers, which rendered
them formidable and turbulent; by favoring the rising power of the commons; by
encouraging population, agriculture, and commerce; by securing to his subjects,
during a long reign, the enjoyment of the blessings which flow from the arts of
peace; by accustoming them to an administration of government, under which the
laws were executed with steadiness and vigor; he made imperceptibly
considerable alterations in the English constitution, and transmitted to his
successor authority so extensive, as rendered him one of the most absolute
monarchs in Europe, and capable of the greatest and most vigorous efforts.
In Spain, the union of all its crowns by the marriage
of Ferdinand and Isabella; the glory that they acquired by the conquest of
Granada, which brought the odious dominion of the Moors to a period; the
command of the great armies which it had been necessary to keep long on foot,
in order to accomplish this; the wisdom and steadiness of their administration;
and the address with which they availed themselves of every incident that
occurred to humble the nobility, and to extend their own prerogative, conspired
in raising these monarchs to such eminence and authority, as none of their
predecessors had ever enjoyed. Though several causes, which shall be explained
in another place, prevented their attaining the same powers with the kings of
France and England, and preserved the feudal constitution longer entire in
Spain, their great abilities supplied the defects of their prerogative, and
improved with such dexterity all the advantages which they possessed, that
Ferdinand carried on his foreign operations, which were very extensive, with
extraordinary vigour and effect.
While these princes were thus enlarging the boundaries
of prerogative, and taking such steps towards rendering their kingdoms capable
of acting with union and force, events occurred, which called them forth to
exert the new powers which they had acquired. These engaged them in such a
series of enterprises and negotiations, that the affairs of all the
considerable nations in Europe came to be insensibly interwoven with each
other; and a great political system was gradually formed, which grew to be an
object or universal attention.
The Craddle of the Haupsburgs
The first event which merits notice, on account of its
influence, in producing this change in the state of Europe, was the marriage of
the daughter of Charles the Bold, the sole heiress of the house of Burgundy.
For some years before her father’s death, she had been considered as the
apparent successor to his territories, and Charles had made proposals of
marrying her to several different princes, with a view of alluring them, by
that offer, to favor the schemes which his restless ambition was continually
forming.
This rendered the alliance with her an object of
general attention; and all the advantages of acquiring possession of her
territories, the most opulent at that time, and the best cultivated of any on
this side of the Alps, were perfectly understood. As soon, then, as the
untimely death of Charles opened the succession [1477, Jan. 5], the eyes of all
the princes in Europe were turned towards Mary, and they felt themselves deeply
interested in the choice which she was about to make of the person on whom she
would bestow that rich inheritance.
Louis XI, from whose kingdom several of the provinces
which she possessed had been dismembered, and whose dominions stretched along
the frontiers of her territories, had every inducement to court her alliance.
He had, likewise, a good title to expect the favorable reception of any
reasonable proposition he should make, with respect to the disposal of a
princess, who was the vassal of his crown, and descended from the royal blood
of France. There were only two propositions, however, which he could make with
propriety. The one was the marriage of the dauphin, the other that of the count
of Angouleme, a prince of the blood, with the heiress of Burgundy. By the
former, he would have annexed all her territories to his crown, and have
rendered France at once the most respectable monarchy in Europe. But the great
disparity of ages between the two parties, Mary being twenty and the dauphin
only eight years old; the avowed resolution of the Flemings, not to choose a
master possessed of such power as might enable him to form schemes dangerous to
their liberties; together with their dread of falling under the odious and
oppressive government of Louis, were obstacles in the way of executing this
plan which it was vain to think of surmounting. By the latter, the
accomplishment of which might have been attained with ease, Mary having
discovered some inclination to a match with the count of Angouleme, Louis would
have prevented the dominions of the house of Burgundy from being conveyed to a
rival power, and in return for such a splendid establishment for the count of
Angouleme, he must have obtained, or would have extorted from him, concessions
highly beneficial to the crown of France. But Louis had been accustomed so long
to the intricacies of a crooked and insidious policy, that he could not be
satisfied with what was obvious and simple; and was so fond of artifice and
refinement, that he came to consider these rather as an ultimate object, than
merely as the means of conducting affairs. From this principle, no less than
from his unwillingness to aggrandize any of his own subjects, or from his
desire of oppressing the house of Burgundy, which he hated, he neglected the
course which a prince less able and artful would have taken, and followed one
more suited to his own genius.
He proposed to render himself, by force of arms,
master of those provinces which Mary held of the crown of France, and even to
push his conquests into her other territories, while he amused her with
insisting continually on the impracticable match with the dauphin. In
prosecuting this plan he displayed wonderful talents and industry, and
exhibited such scenes of treachery, falsehood, and cruelty, as are amazing even
in the history of Louis XI. Immediately upon the death of Charles, he put his
troops in motion, and advanced towards the Netherlands. He corrupted the
leading men in the provinces of Burgundy and Artois, and seduced them to desert
their sovereign. He got admission into some of the frontier towns by bribing
the governors; the gates of others were opened to him in consequence of his
intrigues with the inhabitants. He negotiated with Mary; and, in order to render
her odious to her subjects, he betrayed to them her most important secrets. He
carried on a private correspondence with the two ministers whom she chiefly
trusted, and then communicated the letters which he had received from them to
the states of Flanders, who, enraged at their perfidy, brought them immediately
to trial, tortured them with extreme cruelty, and, unmoved by the tears and
entreaties of their sovereign, who knew and approved of all that the ministers
had done, they beheaded them in her presence.
While Louis, by this conduct, unworthy of a great
monarch, was securing the possession of Burgundy, Artois, and the towns on the
Somme, the states of Flanders carried on a negotiation with the Emperor
Frederic III, and concluded a treaty of marriage between their sovereign and
his son Maximilian, archduke of Austria [1477]. The illustrious birth of that
prince, as well as the high dignity of which he had the prospect, rendered the
alliance honorable for Mary, while, from the distance of his hereditary
territories, and the scantiness of his revenues, his power was so
inconsiderable, as did not excite the jealousy or fear of the Flemings.
Thus Louis by the caprice of his temper, and the
excess of his refinements, put the house of Austria in possession of this noble
inheritance. By this acquisition, the foundation of the future grandeur of
Charles V was laid; and he became master of those territories, which enabled
him to carry on his most formidable and decisive operations against France.
Thus, too, the same monarch who first united the interior force of France and
established it on such a footing, as to render it formidable to the rest of
Europe, contributed, far contrary to his intention, to raise up a rival power,
which, during two centuries, has thwarted the measures, opposed the arms, and
checked the progress of his successors.
The next event of consequence in the fifteenth
century, was the expedition of Charles VIII into Italy [1494]. This occasioned
revolutions no less memorable; produced alterations, both in the military and
political system, which were more immediately perceived; roused the states of
Europe to bolder efforts; and blended their affairs and interests more closely
together. The mild administration of Charles, a weak but generous prince, seems
to have revived the spirit and genius of the French nation, which the rigid
despotism of Louis XI his father, had depressed and almost extinguished. The
ardor for military service, natural to the French nobility, returned, and their
young monarch was impatient to distinguish his reign by some splendid
enterprise. While he was uncertain towards what quarter he should turn his
arms, the solicitations and intrigues of an Italian politician, no less
infamous on account of his crimes, than eminent for his abilities, determined
his choice.
Charles VIII and the Invasion of Italy. 1494
Ludovico Sforza, having formed the design of deposing
his nephew the duke of Milan, and of placing himself on the ducal throne, was
so much afraid of a combination of the Italian powers to oppose this measure,
and to support the injured prince, with whom most of them were connected by
blood or alliance, that he saw the necessity of securing the aid of some able
protector. The king of France was the person to whom he applied; and without
disclosing his own intentions, he labored to prevail with him to march into
Italy, at the head of a powerful army, in order to seize the crown of Naples,
to which Charles had pretensions as heir of the house of Anjou. The right to
that kingdom claimed by the Angevin family, had been conveyed to Louis XI by
Charles of Anjou, count of Maine and Provence. But that sagacious monarch,
though he took immediate possession of those territories of which Charles was
really master, totally disregarded his ideal title to a kingdom, over which
another prince reigned in tranquility; and uniformly declined involving himself
in the labyrinth of Italian politics. His son, more adventurous, or more
inconsiderate, embarked eagerly in this enterprise; and contemning all the
remonstrances of his most experienced counselors, prepared to carry it on with
the utmost vigor.
The power which Charles possessed was so great, that
he reckoned himself equal to this arduous undertaking. His father had
transmitted to him such an ample prerogative, as gave him the entire command of
his kingdom. He himself had added considerably to the extent of his dominions,
by his prudent marriage with the heiress of Bretagne, which rendered him master
of that province, the last of the great fiefs that remained to be annexed to
the crown. He soon assembled forces which he thought sufficient; and so
impatient was he to enter on his career as a conqueror, that sacrificing what
was real, for what was chimerical, he restored Roussillon to Ferdinand, and
gave up part of his father's acquisitions in Artois to Maximilian, with a view
of inducing these princes not to molest France, while he was carrying on his
operations in Italy.
But so different were the efforts of the states of
Europe in the fifteenth Century, from those which we shall behold in the course
of this history, that the army with which Charles undertook this great
enterprise, did not exceed twenty thousand men. The train of artillery,
however, the ammunition, and warlike stores of every kind provided for its use,
were so considerable, as to bear some resemblance to the immense apparatus of
modern war.
When the French entered Italy, they met with nothing
able to resist them. The Italian powers having remained, during a long period, undisturbed
by the invasion of any foreign enemy, had formed a system with respect to their
affairs, both in peace and war, peculiar to themselves. In order to adjust the
interests, and balance the power of the different states into which Italy was
divided, they were engaged in perpetual and endless negotiations with each
other, which they conducted with all the subtlety of a refining and deceitful
policy. Their contests in the field, when they had recourse to arms, were
decided in mock battles, by innocent and bloodless victories. Upon the first
appearance of the danger which now impended, they had recourse to the arts
which they had studied, and employed their utmost skill in intrigue in order to
avert it. But this proving ineffectual, their bands of effeminate mercenaries,
the only military force that remained in the country, being fit only for the
parade of service, were terrified at the aspect of real war, and shrunk at its
approach. The impetuosity of the French valor appeared to them irresistible.
Florence; Pisa, and Rome, opened their gates as the French army advanced. The
prospect of this dreadful invasion struck one king of Naples with such panic
terror, that he died (if we may believe historians) of the fright. Another
abdicated his throne from the same pusillanimous spirit. A third fled out of
his dominions, as soon as the enemy appeared on the Neapolitan frontiers.
Charles, after marching thither from the bottom of the Alps, with as much
rapidity, and almost as little opposition, as if he had been on a progress
through his own dominions, took quiet possession of the throne of Naples, and
intimidated or gave law to every power in Italy.
Such was the conclusion of an expedition, that must be
considered as the first great exertion of those new powers which the princes of
Europe had acquired, and now began to exercise. Its effects were no less
considerable, than its success had been astonishing. The Italians, unable to
resist the impression of the enemy who broke in upon them, permitted him to
hold on his course undisturbed. They quickly perceived that no single power,
which they could rouse to action, was an equal match for a monarch who ruled
over such extensive territories, and was at the head of such a martial people;
but that a confederacy might accomplish what the separate members of it durst
not attempt. To this expedient, the only one that remained to deliver or to
preserve them from the yoke, they had recourse. While Charles inconsiderately
wasted his time at Naples in festivals and triumphs on account of his past
successes, or was fondly dreaming of future conquests in the East, to the
empire of which he now aspired, they formed against him a powerful combination
of almost all the Italian states, supported by the emperor Maximilian, and
Ferdinand king of Aragon. The union of so many powers, who suspended or forgot
all their particular animosities, that they might act in concert against an
enemy who had become formidable to them all, awakened Charles from his
thoughtless security. He saw now no prospect of safety but in returning to
France. An army of thirty thousand men, assembled by the allies, was ready to
obstruct his march; and though the French, with a daring courage, which more
than countervailed their inferiority in number, broke through that great body
and gained a victory, which opened to their monarch a safe passage into his own
territories, he was stripped of all his conquests in Italy, in as short a time
as it had taken to acquire them; and the political system in that country
resumed the same appearance as before his Invasion.
The sudden and decisive effect of this confederacy
seems to have instructed the princes and statesmen of Italy as much as the
irruption of the French had disconcerted and alarmed them. They had extended,
on this occasion, to the affairs of Europe, the maxims of that political
science which had hitherto been applied only to regulate the operations of the
petty states in their own country. They had discovered the method of preventing
any monarch from rising to such a degree of power, as was inconsistent with the
general liberty; and had manifested the importance of attending to that great
secret in modern policy, the preservation of a proper distribution of power
among all the members of the system into which the states of Europe are formed.
During all the wars of which Italy from that time was the theatre, and amidst
the hostile operations which the imprudence of Louis XII and the ambition of
Ferdinand of Aragon, carried on in that country, with little interruption, from
the close of the fifteenth century, to that period at which the subsequent
history commences, the maintaining a proper balance of power between the contending
parties, became the great object of attention to the statesmen of Italy. Nor
was the idea confined to them. Self-preservation taught other powers to adopt
it. It grew to be fashionable and universal. From this era we can trace the
progress of that intercourse between nations, which has linked the powers of
Europe so closely together; and can discern the operations of that provident
policy, which, during peace, guards against remote and contingent dangers; and,
in war, has prevented rapid and destructive conquests.
The Black Bands
This was not the only effect of the operations which
the great powers of Europe carried on in Italy. They contributed to render
general such a change, as the French had begun to make in the state of their
troops; and obliged all the princes who appeared on this new theatre of action,
to put the military force of their kingdoms on an establishment similar to that
of France. When the seat of war came to be remote from the countries which
maintained the contest, the service of the feudal vassals ceased to be of any
use; and the necessity of employing soldiers regularly trained to arms, and
kept in constant pay, came at once to be evident. When Charles VIII marched
into Italy, his cavalry was entirely composed of those companies of gendarmes,
embodied by Charles VII and continued by Louis Xl; his infantry consisted
partly of Swiss, hired of the Cantons, and partly of Gascons, armed and
disciplined after the Swiss model. To these Louis XII added a body of Germans,
well known in the wars of Italy by the name of the Black Bands. But neither of
these monarchs made any account of the feudal militia, or ever had recourse to
that military force which they might have commanded, in virtue of the ancient
institutions in their kingdom. Maximilian and Ferdinand, as soon as they began
to act in Italy, employed similar instruments, and trusted the execution of
their plans entirely to mercenary troops.
This innovation in the military system was quickly
followed by another, which the custom of employing Swiss in the Italian wars
was the occasion of introducing. The arms and discipline of the Swiss were
different from those of other European nations. During their long and violent
struggles in defence of their liberties against the house of Austria, whose
armies, like those of other considerable princes, consisted chiefly of
heavy-armed cavalry, the Swiss found that their poverty, and the small number
of gentlemen residing in their country, at that time barren and ill cultivated,
put it out of their power to bring into the field any body of horse capable of
facing the enemy. Necessity compelled them to place all their confidence in
infantry; and in order to render it capable of withstanding the shock of
cavalry, they gave the soldiers breastplates and helmets as defensive armour;
together with long spears, halberts, and heavy swords, as weapons of offence.
They formed them into large battalions ranged in deep and close array, so that
they could present on every side a formidable front to the enemy. The men at
arms could make no impression on the solid strength of such a body. It repulsed
the Austrians in all their attempts to conquer Switzerland. It broke the
Burgundian gendarmerie, which was scarcely inferior to that of France, either
in number or reputation; and when first called to act in Italy, it bore down,
by its irresistible force, every enemy that attempted to oppose it. These
repeated proofs of the decisive effect of infantry, exhibited on such
conspicuous occasions, restored that service to reputation, and gradually
re-established the opinion which had been long exploded, of its superior importance
in the operations of war. But the glory which the Swiss had acquired, having
inspired them with such high ideas of their own prowess and consequence as
frequently rendered them mutinous and insolent, the princes who employed them
became weary of depending on the caprice of foreign mercenaries, and began to
turn their attention towards the improvement of their national infantry.
The German powers, having the command of men, whom
nature has endowed with that steady courage and persevering strength which
forms them to be soldiers, soon modeled their troops in such a manner, that
they vied with the Swiss both in discipline and valor.
The French monarchs, though more slowly, and with
greater difficulty, accustomed the impetuous spirit of their people to
subordination and discipline; and were at such pains to render their national
infantry respectable, that as early as the reign of Louis XII several gentlemen
of high rank had so far abandoned their ancient ideas, as to condescend to
enter into that service.
The Spaniards, whose situation made it difficult to
employ any other than their national troops, in the southern parts of Italy,
which was the chief scene of their operations in that country, not only adopted
the Swiss discipline, but improved upon it, by mingling a proper number of
soldiers, armed with heavy muskets, in their battalions; and thus formed that
famous body of infantry, which during a century and a half, was the admiration
and terror of all Europe. The Italian states gradually diminished the number of
their cavalry, and, in imitation of their more powerful neighbors, brought the
strength of their armies to consist in foot soldiers. From this period the
nations of Europe have carried on war with forces more adapted to every species
of service, more capable of acting in every country, and better fitted both for
making conquests, and for preserving them.
As their efforts in Italy led the people of Europe to
these improvements in the art of war, they gave them likewise the first idea of
the expense with which it is accompanied when extensive or of long continuance,
and accustomed every nation to the burden of such impositions as are necessary
for supporting it. While the feudal policy subsisted in full vigor, while
armies were composed of military vassals called forth to attack some
neighboring power, and to perform, in a short campaign, the services which they
owed to their sovereign, the expense of war was extremely moderate. A small
subsidy enabled a prince to begin and to finish his greatest military
operations. But when Italy became the theatre on which the powers of Europe
contended for superiority, the preparations requisite for such a distant
expedition, the pay of armies kept constantly on foot, their subsistence in a
foreign country, the sieges to be undertaken, and the towns to be defended,
swelled the charges of war immensely, and, by treating demands unknown in less
active times, multiplied taxes in every kingdom. The progress of ambition,
however, was so rapid, and princes extended their operations so fast, that it
was impossible at first to establish funds proportional to the increase of
expense which these occasioned. When Charles VIII invaded Naples, the sums
requisite for carrying on that enterprise so far exceeded those which France
had been accustomed to contribute for the support of government, that before he
reached the frontiers of Italy, his treasury was exhausted, and the domestic
resources, of which his extensive prerogative gave him the command, was at an
end. As he durst not venture to lay any new imposition on his people, oppressed
already with the weight of unusual burdens; the only expedient that remained
was, to borrow of the Genoese as much money as might enable him to continue his
march. But he could not obtain a sufficient sum, without consenting to pay
annually the exorbitant interest of forty-two livres for every hundred that he
received. We may observe the same disproportion between the efforts and
revenues of other princes, his contemporaries. From this period, taxes went on
increasing; and during the reign of Charles V such sums were levied in every
state, as would have appeared enormous at the close of the fifteenth century,
and gradually prepared the way for the still more exorbitant exactions of
modern times.
The League of Cambray
The last transaction, previous to the reign of Charles
V that merits attention on account of its influence upon the state of Europe,
is the league of Cambray. To humble the republic of Venice, and to divide its
territories, was the object of all the powers who united in this confederacy.
The civil constitution of Venice, established on a firm basis, had suffered no
considerable alteration for several centuries; during which, the senate
conducted its affairs by maxims of policy no less prudent than vigorous, and
adhered to these with a uniform consistent spirit, which gave that commonwealth
great advantage over other states, whose views and measures changed as often as
the form of their government, or the persons who administered it. By these
unintermitted exertions of wisdom and valor, the Venetians enlarged the
dominions of their commonwealth, until it became the most considerable power in
Italy; while their extensive commerce, the useful and curious manufactures
which they carried on, together with the large share which they had acquired of
the lucrative commerce with the East, rendered Venice the most opulent state in
Europe.
The power of the Venetians was the object of terror to
their Italian neighbors. Their wealth was viewed with envy by the greatest
monarchs, who could not vie with many of their private citizens in the
magnificence of their buildings, in the richness of their dress and furniture,
or in splendor and elegance of living. Julius II, whose ambition was superior,
and his abilities equal to those of any pontiff who ever sat on the papal
throne, conceived the idea of this league against the Venetians, and
endeavored, by applying to those passions which I have mentioned, to persuade
other princes to join in it. By working upon the fears of the Italian powers,
and upon the avarice of several monarchs beyond the Alps, he induced them, in
concurrence with other causes, which it is not my province to explain, to form
one of the most powerful confederacies that Europe had ever beheld, against
those haughty republicans.
The emperor, the king of France, the king of Aragon,
and the pope, were principals in the league of Cambray, to which almost all the
princes of Italy acceded, the least considerable of them hoping for some share
in the spoils of a state which they deemed to be now devoted to destruction.
The Venetians might have diverted this storm, or have broken its force; but with
a presumptuous rashness, to which there is nothing similar in the course of
their history, they waited its approach. The impetuous valor of the French
rendered ineffectual all their precautions for the safety of the republic; and
the fatal battle of Ghiarraddada entirely ruined the army, on which they relied
for defence. Julius seized all the towns which they held in the ecclesiastical
territories. Ferdinand re-annexed the towns of which they had got possession on
the coast of Calabria, to his Neapolitan dominions. Maximilian, at the head of
a powerful army, advanced towards Venice on the one side. The French pushed
their conquests on the other. The Venetians, surrounded by so many enemies, and
left without one ally, sunk from the height of presumption to the depths of
despair; abandoned all their territories on the continent; and shut themselves
up in their capital, as their last refuge, and the only place which they hoped
to preserve.
This rapid success, however, proved fatal to the
confederacy. The members of it, whose union continued while they were engaged
in seizing their prey, began to feel their ancient jealousies and animosities
revive, as soon as they had a prospect of dividing it. When the Venetians
observed these symptoms of distrust and alienation, a ray of hope broke in upon
them; the spirit natural to their councils returned; they resumed such wisdom
and firmness, as made some atonement for their former imprudence and dejection;
they recovered part of the territory which they had lost; they appeased the
pope and Ferdinand by well-timed concessions in their favor; and at length
dissolved the confederacy, which had brought their commonwealth to the brink of
ruin.
Julius, elated with beholding the effects of a league
which he himself had planned, and imagining that nothing was too arduous for
him to undertake, conceived the idea of expelling every foreign power out of
Italy, and bent all the force of his mind towards executing a scheme so well
suited to his enterprising genius. He directed his first attack against the
French, who, on many accounts, were more odious to the Italians, than any of
the foreigners who had acquired dominion in their country. By his activity and
address, he prevailed on most of the powers, who had joined in the league of
Cambray, to turn their arms against the king of France, their former ally; and
engaged Henry VIII who had lately ascended the throne of England, to favor
their operations by invading France. Louis XII resisted all the efforts of this
formidable and unexpected confederacy with undaunted fortitude. Hostilities
were carried on, during several campaigns, in Italy, on the frontiers of Spain,
and in Picardy, with alternate success. Exhausted, at length, by the variety as
well as extent of his operations; unable to withstand a confederacy which
brought against him superior force, conducted with wisdom and acting with
perseverance; Louis found it necessary to conclude separate treaties of peace
with his enemies; and the war terminated with the loss of everything which the
French had acquired in Italy, except the castle of Milan, and a few
inconsiderable towns in that duchy.
The various negotiations carried on during this busy
period, and the different combinations formed among powers hitherto little
connected with each other, greatly increased that intercourse among the nations
of Europe, which I have mentioned as one effect of the events in the fifteenth
century; while the greatness of the object at which different nations aimed,
the distant expeditions which they undertook, as well as the length and
obstinacy of the contest in which they engaged, obliged them to exert
themselves with a vigour and perseverance unknown in the preceding ages.
Those active scenes which the following history will
exhibit, as well as the variety and importance of those transactions which
distinguish the period to which it extends, are not to be ascribed solely to
the ambition, to the abilities, or to the rivalship of Charles V and of Francis
I. The kingdoms of Europe had arrived at such a degree of improvement in the
internal administration of government, and princes had acquired such command of
the national force which was to be exerted in foreign wars, that they were in a
condition to enlarge the sphere of their operations, to multiply their claims
and pretensions, and to increase the vigour of their efforts. Accordingly the
sixteenth century opened with the certain prospect of its abounding in great
and interesting events.
SECTION III.
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